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I.    INTRODUCTION 
A “transfer” is “disposing of or parting with—(i) property; or (ii) an 
interest in property” under the Bankruptcy Code (the Code).1  This 
seemingly simple statutory definition, coupled with a frequently cited 
legislative intent to broadly interpret transfer, has caused some controversy 
within the federal courts.2  Specifically, there is controversy as to a trustee’s 
attempt to avoid, as to allegedly fraudulent transfers, and as to a debtor’s 
deposits into a bank account. 
To illustrate this issue with a hypothetical, imagine an individual that 
operated an intricate Ponzi scheme.  In the traditional sense, he solicited 
investments from friends, family, and acquaintances with promises of large 
capital returns, only to expend the monies for personal use and funnel 
investment funds into fabricated returns for the previous investor that was 
induced to subsidize the scheme.3  Imagine an individual who ultimately 
defrauded two dozen investors, causing a loss of roughly $7 million.4 
Our hypothetical schemer was thorough and careful, issuing investors 
promissory notes detailing their interest rates and due dates.5  But despite 
successful maintenance of his system for some three years, he ultimately 
faced a twenty-count indictment, including charges of money laundering 
 
1. 11 U.S.C. § 101(54)(D) (2012).  For additional discussion of a “transfer” under the 
Bankruptcy Code, see infra p. 110 and note 61.  
2. See Ivey v. First Citizens Bank & Tr. Co. (In re Whitley), 848 F.3d 205, 208 (4th Cir.) 
(discussing the various courts that have employed the legislative history in determining whether a 
conveyance constitutes a transfer under the Bankruptcy Code), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 314 (2017). 
3. United States v. Whitley, 544 F. App’x 154, 156 (4th Cir. 2013).  The facts in the above 
hypothetical are based squarely on the debtor-defendant James Edward Whitley.  Whitley was indicted 
in September 2010 by a grand jury and later pled guilty to two counts—one of wire fraud and one of 
money laundering—admitting to the operation of a fraudulent investment scheme.  Id. at 155–56.  The 
egregious nature of Whitley’s scheme and the impact of the statements given by the victims caused the 
district court to vary upward from the sentencing guidelines and impose concurrent sentences of 
120 months on each of the two counts.  Id. at 156. 
4. Id. at 156. 
5. Id. 
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and wire fraud.6  After he pled guilty and was sentenced to a considerable 
amount of time in prison, a group of creditors filed an involuntary petition 
for bankruptcy against him.7 
Throughout the operation of his scheme, our debtor maintained a 
personal checking account at a bank to manage his investment monies—he 
deposited funds, wrote checks, and sent and received wire transfers.8  While 
the debtor deposited millions of dollars into his account in the peak of his 
scheme, at the time the bankruptcy petition was filed, only a few dollars 
remained in the account.9  Shortly thereafter, the trustee filed a complaint 
against the bank where the debtor maintained his checking account.10  
Specifically, the trustee contended various deposits and wire transfers made 
and received by the debtor constituted fraudulent transfers from the debtor 
to the bank and were therefore subject to the trustee’s avoidance powers.11  
The trustee alleged that the bank was aware of the debtor’s illegal activity, 
and permitted the debtor to use the account in furtherance of his scheme.12 
If the trustee is unable to recover the funds he alleges were fraudulently 
transferred out of the debtor’s account, the estate will be made up only of 
the remaining funds.  However, if the trustee may pursue the transfers and 
successfully avoid them as fraudulent, the estate will be replenished and 
better positioned to satisfy the claims of creditors, though the bank may be 
collaterally responsible for the actions of the debtor. 13 
One may inquire as to how the bank could possibly be liable for the 
criminal actions of a customer who simply maintains a checking account.  
Ponzi schemes often involve targeting vulnerable, elderly individuals to 
 
6. Id. at 155. 
7. In re Whitley, 848 F.3d at 206. 
8. Id. 
9. Brief in Opposition at 5, Ivey v. First Citizens Bank & Tr. Co., 138 S. Ct. 314 (2017) 
(No. 16-1330), 2017 WL 3327807, at *5. 
10. See In re Whitley, 848 F.3d at 206 (detailing the procedural history of the case).   
11. Id. at 205–06.  A debtor who transfers funds with the actual intent to hinder, delay, or 
defraud creditors subjects those transfers to the avoidance powers of the trustee pursuant to § 548.  
11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(A) (2012). 
12. In re Whitley, 848 F.3d at 205–06. 
13. See 11 U.S.C. § 550 (outlining the remedies available as a consequence of an avoidable 
transfer).  Further, the trustee can seek damages from the initial transferee—in this case, the bank that 
operated the accounts used to perpetuate the debtor’s Ponzi scheme.  Specifically, § 550(a)(1) allows 
the trustee to recover, for the benefit of the estate, the value of the property from “the initial transferee 
of such transfer or the entity for whose benefit such transfer was made[.]”  Id. § 550(a)(1) (providing 
such relief when the property itself that was transferred cannot be readily recovered and returned to 
the estate). 
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induce them to invest their savings in hopes of increasing their retirement 
funds or leaving a greater inheritance to their heirs.14  For these reasons, 
Ponzi schemes can be devastating for the victims who are induced to 
invest.15  To combat the effects, the trustee will deploy all available 
resources to make the victims whole.  In the case of the hypothetical, the 
trustee’s only recourse is to exercise his avoidance powers and seek recovery 
of the funds from a transferee, which the trustee alleges the bank is.16  If 
the trustee is unable to recover monies fraudulently acquired and expended 
by the debtor, the estate will be inadequate to satisfy claims of secured 
creditors, let alone the victims, who, by virtue of their unsecured promissory 
note, will be entitled to very little in bankruptcy proceedings. 
In contrast, if the court were to allow the trustee to recover funds from 
the bank as a transferee, while victims would be made whole, banks would 
face potentially unlimited liability.17  In the case of our hypothetical debtor, 
the account was depleted by the time of filing. 18  If the court were to permit 
the trustee to avoid deposits as fraudulent transfers, the bank would be 
required to compensate the estate for the value of the funds repeatedly 
 
14. See, e.g., Cecilio Padilla, Man Convicted for Ponzi Scheme Took More Than $90 Million from Elderly 
Victims, FOX 40 (July 29, 2013, 4:11 PM), http://fox40.com/2013/07/29/man-convicted-for-ponzi-
scheme-took-more-than-90-million-from-elderly-victims/ [https://perma.cc/NJ9C-LPAV] (featuring 
a classic example of a common theme among Ponzi schemes—elderly victims).  See also Associated 
Press, Michigan Man Targets the Elderly in $46.5M Ponzi Scheme, FOX NEWS (Dec. 3. 2014), 
http://www.foxnews.com/us/2014/12/03/michigan-man-gets-30-years-for-465m-ponzi-scheme.ht 
ml [https://perma.cc/2JGR-GEQH] (detailing a $46.5 million Ponzi scheme targeting elderly 
individuals).   
15. See, e.g., Denisse Salazar, Elderly Victims Confront Man Who Ran $11 Million Fraud, ORANGE 
COUNTY REG. (Dec. 17, 2009, 3:23 PM), http://www.ocregister.com/2009/12/17/elderly-victims-
confront-man-who-ran-11-million-fraud/ [https://perma.cc/CAQ9-5KB8] (“About [thirty] of the 
victims, some of whom are now deceased, testified . . . .  They told the court how being defrauded out 
of their life savings affected them emotionally, physically[,] and financially.”). 
16. See Craig T. Lutterbein, Note, “Fraud and Deceit Abound” but do the Bankruptcy Courts Really 
Believe Everyone is Crooked: The Bayou Decision and the Narrowing of “Good Faith”, 18 AM. BANKR. INST. L. 
REV. 405, 405–06 (2010) (“Ponzi schemes present unique problems for bankruptcy courts. . . .  In 
Ponzi schemes, early investors are simply paid from the investments of later investors.”).  Thus, in 
some instances the trustee may pursue early investors who received a return at the expense of later 
investors.  Id. at 406.  Under these circumstances, “bankruptcy courts overseeing the liquidation of 
Ponzi schemes are forced to decide what is the most equitable way to divide the remaining money 
between the defrauded investors.”  Id. 
17. See Bonded Fin. Servs., Inc. v. European Am. Bank, 838 F.2d 890, 893 (7th Cir. 1988) 
(illuminating the significant risks to banks and financial intermediaries if courts were to treat them as 
initial transferees and impose liability). 
18. See supra text accompanying note 9. 
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deposited and withdrawn by the debtor.19  The ramifications of a ruling in 
favor of the trustee would be disastrous for banks; how would they vet every 
customer maintaining a simple checking account?  The costs would likely 
flow down to all consumers through a bank’s necessity to acquire greater 
insurance or charge inflated fees out of fear of being liable for a potential 
debtor’s transfers into his own account.20 
This dilemma is precisely the issue the Supreme Court declined to hear 
on certiorari in late 2017.21  Although the Court did not provide its 
reasoning as to why it elected not to consider the issue, one can speculate 
that it was because the Court deemed this controversy to be less than a true 
split entrenched in the circuit courts.22  Despite the statutory definition of 
transfer having been interpreted differently in various circuits, it is important 
to note that the different rulings were on very distinct facts.23  As will be 
discussed, infra, one circuit decided that a mere transfer of funds into a bank 
account constitutes a transfer under the Bankruptcy Code—rendering it 
avoidable by the trustee.24  In contrast, as in our hypothetical, one circuit 
 
19. See 11 U.S.C. § 550 (2012) (providing the trustee with a remedy to pursue a transferee of 
fraudulent transfers for the value conveyed). 
20. See Bonded Fin. Servs., Inc., 838 F.2d at 892 (“Fraudulent conveyance law protects creditors 
from last-minute diminutions of the pool of assets in which they have interests.  They accordingly need 
not monitor debtors so closely, and the savings in monitoring costs make businesses more productive.” 
(citing Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Fraudulent Conveyance Law and Its Proper Domain, 
38 VAND. L. REV. 829, 833 (1985); Robert Charles Clark, The Duties of the Corporate Debtor to Its Creditors, 
90 HARV. L. REV. 505, 554–60 (1977))). 
21. Bill Rochelle, Features: Two Bankruptcy Cases on the Supreme Court’s Calendar: Plus Other Circuit 
Splits Waiting in the Wings, 38-11 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 28, 68 (2017). 
22. See Brief in Opposition, supra note 9, at 9 (arguing the circuit split between the Fourth, 
Ninth, and Tenth Circuits is illusory due to the distinct facts on which differing outcomes were decided 
and claiming instead “no split exists”).  In the brief in opposition of certiorari in In re Whitley, the 
respondent insists the Court need not grant certiorari, as the Court “resolve[s] genuine splits—different 
circuits reaching different results on similar facts.”  Id.  Despite respondent’s position that there is no 
such genuine split on this legal issue, it remains true that various lower courts and circuit courts have 
reached diverging holdings as to whether a deposit can constitute a transfer.  Therefore, even if the 
issue is not yet ripe for the Court’s judgment, these diverging courts still require guidance to address 
the issue when faced with a deposit that a trustee seeks to avoid as a fraudulent transfer. 
23. Compare Locke v. Schafer (In re Schafer), 294 B.R. 126, 131–32 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (finding a 
debtor that withdrew funds and deposited them in a new bank account with the intent to prevent a 
creditor from attaching his funds was a fraudulent transfer), with Furr v. TD Bank, N.A. (In re 
Rollaguard Sec., LLC), 570 B.R. 859, 871 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2017) (determining the trustee could not 
recover against the bank for fraudulent transfers resulting from a debtor’s deposit into his own 
unrestricted bank account because the bank was not negligent in its maintenance of the debtor’s 
account). 
24. See generally Redmond v. Tuttle, 698 F.2d 414, 418 (10th Cir. 1983) (“Debtors were under 
no legal compulsion to transfer the funds; they had complete control over the decision to deposit the 
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held a deposit did not constitute a transfer within the context of a Ponzi 
scheme.25  Notably, the circuit that declined to deem a deposit as a transfer 
did so on the trustee’s attempt to hold a bank liable for funds deposited and 
withdrawn using a checking account.26  By the time of the filing for 
bankruptcy, the estate was depleted and the trustee’s only avenue of 
recovery for the creditors and victims of the schemes was to recover the 
funds he alleged were fraudulently transferred to the bank.27 
Consistency lacks within the United States bankruptcy and federal courts 
as to whether a debtor’s deposit or withdrawal into or out of his bank 
account can constitute a transfer, rendering it subject to the avoidance 
powers of the trustee.28  Specifically, there is a divide within the Fourth 
Circuit, Ninth Circuit, and Tenth Circuit on this precise issue.29  What can 
be said conclusively is that the determination of whether a deposit rises to 
the level of a transfer is a highly fact-specific inquiry, which is evidenced by 
the inconsistent decisions among courts.  This comment seeks to analyze 
that divide, determine how “transfer” should be interpreted, and provide 
guidance to courts and practitioners through factors they may consider 
when faced with a deposit a trustee seeks to avoid as a fraudulent transfer.  
This comment will also consider the effect on banks and financial 
 
checks and what instructions to include and cannot now claim that the bank’s handling of the deposits 
renders them something other than voluntary transfers.” (citing Huebner v. Trapp (In re Huebner), 
18 B.R. 193, 195 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1982))).  See discussion infra Part IV. 
25. See Ivey v. First Citizens Bank & Tr. Co. (In re Whitley), 848 F.3d 205, 210 (4th Cir.) (holding 
a debtor’s deposits and withdrawals throughout the course of a Ponzi scheme did not rise to the level 
of transfers that could be avoided by the trustee), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 314 (2017). 
26. Id. at 206–07. 
27. See 11 U.S.C. § 542 (2012) (requiring a creditor or any individual or entity in possession, 
custody, or control of property of the debtor to turn over the property to the trustee, provided it has 
value to the estate); Jubber v. Bank of Utah (In re C.W. Mining Co.), 749 F.3d 895, 897 (10th Cir. 2014). 
28. Compare Haag v. Nw. Bank (In re Haag) (Haag I), No. 10-07917-EWH, Adv. No. 10-01207-
EWH, 2012 WL 4465353, at *6 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Sept. 27, 2012) (holding a debtor’s withdrawal of 
currency from his bank account, placement into a safety deposit box, and subsequent deposits into his 
wife’s account were fraudulent transfers), aff’d, 584 F. App’x 620 (9th Cir. 2014), with Furr, 570 B.R. 
at 877 (precluding the trustee from avoiding, as allegedly fraudulent transfers, a debtor’s deposits into 
his own bank account). 
29. See In re Whitley, 848 F.3d at 210 (holding a debtor’s deposits into an unrestricted checking 
account did not constitute transfers to the bank maintaining the account); Bernard v. Sheaffer (In re 
Bernard), 96 F.3d 1279, 1283 (9th Cir. 1996) (declaring both depositing and withdrawing money from 
bank accounts constitutes a transfer and emphasizing the breadth of the definition of transfer under 
the Bankruptcy Code); Tuttle, 698 F.2d at 418 (asserting depositing checks into a debtor’s account 
constituted a voluntary, avoidable transfer). 
6
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intermediaries should courts impose liability on them as initial transferees 
of an account holder’s deposits and withdrawals. 
II.    BACKGROUND 
By way of background, bankruptcy law is exclusively an issue of federal 
law and largely governed by statute.30  Title 11 of the United States Code, 
commonly referred to as the Bankruptcy Code, sets forth procedures that 
govern a bankruptcy case and related proceedings.31  The Code serves as a 
mechanism for promoting uniformity in the application and administration 
of bankruptcy laws throughout the United States.32 
A bankruptcy case is born from the filing of a petition.33  Such a petition 
may be filed by the debtor himself, or in certain cases, by creditors of a 
debtor.34  In other words, bankruptcy may be commenced voluntarily or 
involuntarily.  The commencement of bankruptcy is accompanied by the 
immediate privilege of the automatic stay pursuant to § 362.35  The stay 
essentially prevents actions against the debtor by way of collection efforts, 
foreclosures, garnishments, and the like, shielding the debtor and allowing 
for the bankruptcy process to begin without interruption.36 
 
30. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.  The exclusive federal jurisdiction vested in bankruptcy courts 
derives from Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution.  Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (2012) 
(declaring district courts have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases under Title 11, subject to 
specific exemptions); Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 474 (2011) (explaining bankruptcy judges hear 
and adjudicate “all core proceedings arising under [T]itle 11, or arising in a case under [T]itle 11” 
(quoting 11 U.S.C. § 157(a))).  Bankruptcy judges have been appointed in each of the federal districts 
for fourteen-year terms.  Id. at 473.  
31. See 11 U.S.C. § 103 (describing the applicability of the different chapters within Title 11 to 
bankruptcy proceedings).  “In 1978, Congress fundamentally restructured bankruptcy law by passing 
the new Bankruptcy Code.”  Begier v. I.R.S., 496 U.S. 53, 63 (1990).  Within Title 11, there are 
individual subsections governing the various chapters of bankruptcy available.  For example, Chapter 7 
governs liquidation, while Chapter 11 governs reorganization.  Compare 11 U.S.C. §§ 721–728 
(providing guidelines on collection, liquidation, and distribution of the estate), with id. § 1121 
(discussing filing of a reorganization plan). 
32. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (highlighting the importance of uniformity in the context of 
bankruptcy law). 
33. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 301(a) (stating a voluntary case is commenced by the filing of a petition 
pursuant to whichever chapter the debtor is seeking relief under).  
34. Compare id. § 301 (governing the filing of voluntary bankruptcies), with id. § 303 (governing 
the filing of involuntary bankruptcies).  Notably, only a Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 bankruptcy may be 
commenced involuntarily.  Id. § 303(b).  A petition may also be filed jointly pursuant to § 302 by a 
debtor and his or her spouse.  Id. § 302. 
35. See id. § 362 (outlining the function and procedure of the automatic stay). 
36. Id.  A primary goal of bankruptcy is to provide debtors with a “fresh start” to their financial 
affairs.  Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991).  The automatic stay helps to effectuate the goal 
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Once a petition is filed, an “estate” is created.37  An estate is comprised 
of all of the debtor’s legal or equitable interests in property at the time of 
filing.38  Additionally, a trustee is appointed and charged with a wide variety 
of duties within the case.39  Generally, a trustee is charged with the duty to 
collect and liquidate the property of the estate, investigate the finances of 
the debtor, and be accountable for all property received.40 
Along with the appointment of the trustee and automatic creation of the 
estate pursuant to § 541, a debtor completes a schedule detailing its liabilities 
and its creditors, who are subsequently sent notice of the filing.41  Creditors 
are then able to file a proof of claim to be allowed or disallowed by the 
court.42  Once creditors have filed their claims against the debtor, the logical 
next step is to evaluate the assets of the debtor within the estate.  Section 541 
details which interests in property a debtor possesses are property of the 
estate.43   
The assembly and maintenance of the estate is a crucial aspect of the 
trustee’s duties.44  Consequently, the trustee seeks to preserve and maximize 
 
of providing a fresh start by allowing “insolvent debtors [to] reorder their affairs, make peace with their 
creditors, and enjoy ‘a new opportunity in life with a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the 
pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt.’”  Id. (quoting Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 
244 (1934)). 
37. 11 U.S.C. § 541. 
38. Id. § 541(a)(1); see also Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274, 284 n.12 (1985) (“The commencement 
of a case under the Bankruptcy Code creates an estate[,] which, with limited exceptions, consists of all 
the debtor’s property wherever located.” (citing 11 U.S.C. § 541)). 
39. 11 U.S.C. § 704 (outlining the duties of the trustee).  A trustee is charged with the authority 
to litigate any issue in a bankruptcy case.  Thomas D. Buckley, The Untapped Power of Bankruptcy’s Wild 
Card: The United States Trustee, 6 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 249, 250 (1997).  Further, the trustee serves the 
system, rather than the debtor or a particular creditor, and acts in the “public interest to promote 
efficiency and to protect and preserve the integrity of the bankruptcy system.”  Id. at 268 n.22. 
40. 11 U.S.C. § 704. 
41. Id. § 521. 
42. Id. § 501.  Any creditor may file a proof claim, while an equity security holder may file a 
proof of interest.  Id. § 501(a).  A proof of claim is deemed allowed subject to the objection of a party 
in interest.  Id. § 502. 
43. Id. § 541.  Property of the estate includes all “legal or equitable interests of the debtor in 
property as of the commencement of the case.”  Id. § 541(a)(1).  Property of the estate will not include 
specific exemptions, such as any interest of the debtor as a lessee under a lease of nonresidential real 
property, any funds placed in an education individual retirement account, and any interest of the debtor 
in liquid or gaseous hydrocarbons.  Id. § 541.  A comprehensive list of the items that will not become 
property of the estate may be found at § 541(b)(1)–(10).  Although some property may be exempt, it 
is still included as part of the compilation of the estate initially, despite its potential to be unreachable 
by creditors. 
44. Id. § 704(a)(1). 
8
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the estate to satisfy as many creditors’ claims as possible.45  In furtherance 
of that goal, a trustee may avoid certain pre-petition transfers or attack post-
petition transfers.46  This is the trustee’s power of avoidance.47  An 
important goal of bankruptcy law is to promote equality of distribution of 
property to creditors, with a natural preference for secured creditors.48  In 
furtherance of that goal, the Bankruptcy Code prevents: (1) creditors from 
dissecting the debtor’s estate shortly before the filing of bankruptcy,49 
(2) debtors from preferring one creditor over another,50 or (3) debtors from 
reducing the value of their estate shortly before or upon filing.51 
These provisions ensure fairness in addressing each claim, and the 
trustee’s avoidance powers equip the trustee with the tools to prevent this 
sort of harm to the estate.52  A trustee may set aside conveyances, including 
payments, sales, exchanges, and liens, that are inconsistent with the Code.53  
The consequence of a conveyance being deemed avoidable is the property 
 
45. See id. (“The trustee shall . . . collect and reduce to money the property of the estate for 
which such trustee serves, and close such estate as expeditiously as is compatible with the best interests 
of parties in interest[.]”). 
46. See THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 68 (1986) 
(“Section 541 allows the trustee to step into the shoes of the debtor in gathering property of the estate, 
and the avoiding powers . . . augment that activity by giving the trustee certain other powers to bring 
assets into the estate.”). 
47. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (providing the trustee’s ability to avoid certain transfers); see also 
JACKSON, supra note 46 (describing the trustee’s avoidance powers as “bring[ing] assets into the 
estate”).  The various avoidance powers are set forth in Chapter 5 of the Bankruptcy Code.  See 
11 U.S.C. § 501 (outlining the contents of Chapter 5, entitled “Creditors, The Debtor, and The 
Estate”). 
48. See Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U.S. 605, 617 (1918) (stating the system of bankruptcy is 
designed to fairly distribute property of the debtor). 
49. See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (protecting the debtor by instituting an automatic stay; resulting in 
creditors being unable to pursue enforcement efforts against a debtor until bankruptcy proceedings 
allow for collection). 
50. See id. § 547 (preserving the estate through prohibiting debtors from making payments to 
certain creditors, thus demonstrating preferential treatment). 
51. See id. § 548 (prohibiting various transfers of assets out of the estate shortly after filing). 
52. See JACKSON, supra note 46, at 70 (“As with all bankruptcy rules, the basis of avoiding 
powers should be to protect the advantages of bankruptcy’s collectivization of the debt-collection 
process.”).  These provisions also implicate the trustee’s avoidance powers.  See Jubber v. Bank of Utah 
(In re C.W. Mining Co.), 749 F.3d 895, 898 (10th Cir. 2014) (“A trustee may avoid a post-petition 
transfer of estate property that was not authorized by the Bankruptcy Code or the court.” (citing 
11 U.S.C. § 549)).  “Any transfer made in violation of the automatic stay is void and the parties are 
returned to the status quo as it existed before the violation occurred.”  Id. at 899 (citing Franklin Savs. 
Ass’n v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 31 F.3d 1020, 1022 (10th Cir. 1994)). 
53. See JACKSON, supra note 46, at 70 (illustrating avoidance powers in the context of the 
trustee’s power to assert the rights of a hypothetical lien creditor). 
9
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or property interest being conveyed will be recovered by the trustee and 
become property of the estate.54  In some instances, for example when real 
property is conveyed, a court may order the recovery of the value of the 
property at the time of the conveyance.55  Further, in some instances, 
recovery may be sought not just from the initial transferee, but from later 
transferees or a party who benefited from the conveyance.56 
Evaluating whether a conveyance may be avoided often requires inquiry 
into whether a transfer of property in fact occurred.57  New York County 
National Bank v. Massey58 provided early guidance from the United States 
Supreme Court as to the issue of whether a deposit may constitute a transfer.  
The Court advised, “[A] deposit of money to one’s credit in a bank does not 
operate to diminish the estate of the depositor . . . .  It is not a transfer of 
property as a payment, pledge, mortgage, gift, or security.”59  Massey was 
issued in 1904, more than seventy years prior to the enactment of the Code, 
and should therefore be considered in light of its historic posture.60 
The modern Code defines “transfer” as “the creation of a lien; the 
retention of title as a security interest; the foreclosure of a debtor’s equity of 
redemption; or each mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, 
voluntary or involuntary, of disposing or parting with—property; or an 




54. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(3).  The remedies for avoidable transfers are set forth in § 550.  Id. § 550. 
55. See id. § 549 (allowing for recovery of the value of the property fraudulently transferred). 
56. Id. § 550(a)(2). 
57. See, e.g., id. § 547 (providing for avoidance of certain preferential transfers, requiring the 
trustee to first establish a transfer occurred). 
58. N.Y. Cty. Nat’l Bank v. Massey, 192 U.S. 138 (1904). 
59. Id. at 147. 
60. See id. (setting forth the Court’s interpretation of “transfer” in 1904). 
61. 11 U.S.C. § 101(54).  “The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 defined ‘transfer’ to ‘include the sale 
and every other and different mode of disposing of or parting with property, or the possession of 
property, absolutely or conditionally, as a payment, pledge, mortgage, gift or security.’”  Petition for a 
Writ of Certiorari at 5, Ivey v. First Citizens Bank & Tr. Co. (In re Whitley), 138 S. Ct. 314 (2017) (No. 
16-1330), 2017 WL 1756947, at *5 (quoting The Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 1, Pub. L. No. 55-
541, 30 Stat. 544, 545 (repealed 1978)).  When the Bankruptcy Act is contrasted with the current 
Bankruptcy Code, the initial definition is far narrower and more restrictive.  In fact, “Congress 
fundamentally restructured bankruptcy law . . . .”  Id. (quoting Begier v. I.R.S., 496 U.S. 53, 63 (1990)).  
This was accomplished by “delet[ing] ‘potentially limiting words’ in the former definition, to make it 
‘as broad as possible.’”  Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 27 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5787, 5813). 
10
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constitutes an “initial transferee.”62 
III.    RELEVANT BANKRUPTCY CODE PROVISIONS IN WHICH THE 
DEFINITION OF “TRANSFER” IS OUTCOME DETERMINATIVE 
There are several provisions within the Bankruptcy Code in which the 
definition of transfer is a threshold question.63  Notably, these provisions 
interact and overlap with the trustee’s avoidance powers.64 
It is thus essential to determine what property belongs to the estate and how 
to treat transactions involving the debtor’s property.  These issues are bound 
up with the [Bankruptcy] Code’s definition of “transfer,” which is often 
critical to the proper administration of a bankruptcy case.  Whether a 
particular act qualifies as a “transfer” can affect the estate’s holdings and the 
assets available to satisfy creditors’ claims.65 
The pre- and post-petition actions that may be set aside by a trustee often 
turn on the issue of whether a certain conveyance made by a debtor 
constitutes a transfer.66  Therefore, the interpretation of the definition is 
crucial to these determinations.  The following examples illustrate the 
importance of how transfer is defined and interpreted. 
A. Pre-Petition Avoidance Actions 
As to pre-petition avoidance actions, §§ 547 and 548 are common 
instances of avoidable conveyances.67 
 
62. See Christy v. Alexander & Alexander of N.Y. Inc. (In re Finley), 130 F.3d 52, 56 (2d Cir. 
1997) (asserting “initial transferee” is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code and discussing how it should 
be interpreted). 
63. See 11 U.S.C. § 547 (governing preferential transfers); id. § 548 (governing fraudulent 
transfers); id. § 549 (governing post-petition transfers).  Various other Bankruptcy Code provisions that 
“turn directly on whether a particular transaction constitutes a ‘transfer’” include §§ 522(g), 541, 550, 
and 727, among others.  Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 61, at 4.  The “definition is central 
to multiple [Bankruptcy] Code provisions that circumscribe transactions involving a debtor’s property.  
And those provisions matter critically to bankruptcy’s core functions . . . .”  Id. at I. 
64. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 548 (allowing the trustee to avoid fraudulent transfers and recover the 
funds or property from the transferee), with id. § 547 (permitting the trustee to recover transfers made 
by a debtor that prefer certain creditors over others). 
65. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 61, at 3–4. 
66. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 547 (authorizing a trustee to avoid preferential transfers, requiring first 
a finding that a transfer occurred). 
67. See id. (authorizing a trustee to avoid any transfer that prefers one creditor at the expense of 
others); see also id. § 548 (outlining when a trustee may avoid a transfer based on a finding that it was 
fraudulently made). 
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1. Section 547 
Section 547 governs conveyances that prefer one creditor over another.68  
“Much of the bankruptcy process and most provisions of the Bankruptcy 
Code sort out rights among creditors . . . [who] generally share in assets of 
the estate ratably in accordance with the value of their nonbankruptcy 
entitlements.”69  It is important, therefore, for the trustee to satisfy 
creditors’ claims in such a way that is equitable and compliant with the 
Code.70  It is rare that an estate has sufficient assets to satisfy all claims, 
which appears obvious when considering the insolvency of the debtor and 
the necessity of filing bankruptcy in the first place.  Consistent with the goal 
of promoting “equality of distribution[,]” a debtor’s ability to repay creditors 
is subject to the requirements set out in § 547.71 
Thus, a conveyance made by the debtor, if it satisfies § 547,72 may be 
reached by the trustee and avoided, rendering the interests transferred part 
of the estate.73  In the context of a debtor’s bank as the alleged transferee, 
the right to setoff often becomes entangled.74  This added layer of 
complexity is derived from the bank often being a creditor of the debtor—
for example, where a debtor has an outstanding balance on a loan in which 
the bank is the lender and the bank captures funds in the debtor’s account 
to offset the amount due.75  The interaction between banks as transferees 
 
68. Id. § 547. 
69. Thomas H. Jackson, Avoiding Powers in Bankruptcy, 36 STAN. L. REV. 725, 727–28 (1984). 
70. See Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U.S. 605, 617 (1918) (discussing the manner of distribution of 
a debtor’s assets to creditors “fairly and equally”). 
71. Emil A. Kleinhaus & Alexander B. Lees, Debt Repayments as Fraudulent Transfers, 88 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 307, 308 (2014) (quoting Lawson v. Ford Motor Co. (In re Roblin Indus., Inc.), 78 F.3d 
30, 40 (2d Cir. 1996)). 
72. To satisfy § 547 and establish a preferential transfer, a trustee has the burden of proving six 
elements by a preponderance of the evidence: “(1) a transfer of the debtor’s property, (2) on account 
of an antecedent debt, (3) to or for a creditor’s benefit, (4) while the debtor was insolvent, (5) within 
[ninety] days prior to bankruptcy[,]” and (6) that provided the creditor with more than it would have 
had the transfer not occurred and the creditor instead pursued its claim in liquidation.  Redmond v. 
Rainstorm, Inc. (In re Lone Star Pub Operations, LLC), 465 B.R. 212, 215 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2012). 
73. 11 U.S.C. § 547. 
74. See id. § 553 (governing a creditor’s right to offset a debt that arose before the 
commencement of a bankruptcy case). 
75. See Lawrence Kalevitch, Setoff and Bankruptcy, 41 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 599, 600 (1993) 
(discussing the right to setoff in the bankruptcy process and procedure and the controversy that 
surrounds it).  When a bank as a creditor employs the right to setoff, the debtor may apparently be 
preferring the bank’s right to repayment at the expense of his other creditors, however the details of 
this issue are out of the scope of this comment.  See id. (“Traditional bankruptcy has honored setoff 
even though this has the effect of conferring a priority on holders of setoff rights.”). 
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and setoff will be discussed, infra, in the discussion of the benefit gained by 
the financial institution from the deposit. 
2. Section 548 
Section 548 governs fraudulent transfers by a debtor.76  The Code’s 
provisions relating to fraudulent transfers protect creditors from the debtor 
engaging in transactions that hinder their rights of having their claims 
satisfied.77  There are four types of fraudulent transactions that are subject 
to avoidance: (1) transfers made with actual intent to hinder, delay, or 
defraud creditors;78 (2) transfers made for less than reasonably equivalent 
value;79 (3) transfers by a general partner to a partner while the general 
partner was insolvent or “became insolvent as a result of the transfer;”80 
and (4) “transfers by debtors to self-settled trusts in which the debtor is a 
beneficiary.”81  This provision is crucial to the prevention of debtors 
diminishing their estate through actual or constructive fraud.82  Despite 
bankruptcy’s exclusively federal jurisdiction, several states have provisions 
that mirror § 548 to reinforce its goals and principles.83 
Before the trustee can seek to avoid a fraudulent transfer pursuant to 
§ 548, a prerequisite is that the court determine a transfer in fact occurred.84  
Therefore, § 548 is a leading example of a Bankruptcy Code provision in 
 
76. 11 U.S.C. § 548. 
77. See Kleinhaus & Lees, supra note 71 (“[T]he basic object of fraudulent conveyance law is to 
see that the debtor uses his limited assets to satisfy some of his creditors; it normally does not try to 
choose among them.” (quoting Boston Trading Grp., Inc. v. Burnazos, 835 F.2d 1504, 1509 (1st Cir. 
1987))). 
78. See John Ames et al., Preferences and Fraudulent Transfers Under the Bankruptcy Code: A Primer in 
Pain, THE AMERICAS RESTRUCTURING AND INSOLVENCY GUIDE, 2008/2009 107, 113 
http://www.americasrestructuring.com/08_SF/p107-115%20Preferences%20and%20fraudulent%2 
0transfers.pdf [https://perma.cc/JJK3-4X2B] (instructing transfers with the intent to impair the rights 
of a creditor are commonly referred to as “actually fraudulent”). 




82. See id. at 114 (resolving the differences between actual and constructive fraud). 
83. Accord TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 24.005 (mirroring 11 U.S.C. § 548 in determining 
what circumstances warrant avoidance of a fraudulent transfer). 
84. See 11 U.S.C. § 547 (2012) (detailing how a transfer may be avoided, implying that a transfer 
must first be performed); see also Ivey v. First Citizens Bank & Tr. Co. (In re Whitley), 848 F.3d 205, 
210 (4th Cir.) (“[W]e find that the deposits and wire transfers at issue here are not § 101(54) 
‘transfers’ . . . [and] therefore cannot be avoidable transfers under § 548(a).”), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 314 
(2017). 
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which the interpretation of transfer is a dispositive question.  Recall the 
hypothetical raised in the introductory portion of this comment.85  Had the 
debtor conveyed currency accumulated in his Ponzi scheme and 
intentionally concealed it from creditors or the trustee to evade attachment 
or collection into the estate, a classic fraudulent transfer would have 
occurred.86  In the alternative, had the debtor conveyed his property to 
another for far below market value only to appear insolvent and without 
assets to creditors, another traditional fraudulent transfer would have 
occurred.87 
Instead, the debtor repeatedly deposited and withdrew funds from a 
checking account at his bank, resulting in the funds of unknowing investors 
being expended on matters other than the purported investment 
opportunity.88  Despite the apparent intent to defraud his investors, the 
debtor did not fraudulently transfer any funds in the conventional sense.89  
Thus, as the trustee assembled the estate, he perceived the bank maintaining 
the checking account as a transferee of funds being fraudulently transferred 
in and out of the debtor’s account and sought relief accordingly.90 
B. Post-Petition Avoidance Actions 
1. Section 549 
Section 549 governs post-petition transfers of property belonging to the 
estate.91  This provision provides a trustee with the authority to avoid an 
unauthorized transfer of property of the estate made after the 
commencement of the bankruptcy case.92  As with §§ 547 and 548, this 
provision turns on whether a particular conveyance constitutes a transfer to 
 
85. See supra text accompanying note 3. 
86. See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(A) (prohibiting transfers with the intent to delay or hinder 
collection or defraud creditors). 
87. See id. § 548(a)(1)(B) (precluding conveyance of a debtor’s property for less than market 
value). 
88. In re Whitley, 848 F.3d at 206. 
89. See id. at 210 (holding no transfer occurred when the debtor deposited and withdrew funds 
from an ordinary, unrestricted checking account). 
90. Id. at 206–07. 
91. 11 U.S.C. § 549. 
92. Id.; see also Vázquez Laboy v. Doral Mortg. Corp. (In re Vázquez Laboy), 647 F.3d 367, 375 
(1st Cir. 2011) (“[A]n avoidance action allows a bankruptcy trustee to cancel an improper conveyance 
or recover for the estate the value of the improperly conveyed property [pursuant to § 549].” (citing 
11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 545, 547(b), 548(a), 549(a))). 
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invoke the trustee’s powers.  Section 549 was designed to protect “the 
bankruptcy estate following its inception” and is “equitable in nature.”93  If 
such a transfer is deemed to have occurred, the applicable remedy is that the 
trustee may recover the property transferred either from the initial 
transferee, or an immediate or mediate transferee of the initial transferee, 
for the benefit of the estate.94 
Between each of the examples briefly discussed, the trustee has the 
authority to avoid certain conveyances in his power and duty to maximize a 
debtor’s estate once a petition has been filed.95  Within each of these 
provisions, many cases have grappled with the issue of what activity 
constitutes a transfer under the Code.96  Specifically, and relevant to this 
comment, cases have addressed the question of whether a deposit or 
withdrawal made by a debtor constituted a transfer.97  It can be observed 
from a survey of the relevant cases that two conflicting schools of thought 
have emerged: a broad interpretation of what constitutes a transfer, and a 
narrow one.98  This difference of opinion by courts has materialized into a 
circuit split between the Fourth Circuit, Ninth Circuit, and Tenth Circuit.99  
 
93. Jobin v. Youth Benefits Unlimited, Inc. (In re M&L Bus. Mach. Co.), 59 F.3d 1078, 1082 
(10th Cir. 1995). 
94. See In re Bankvest Capital Corp., 375 F.3d 51, 62 (1st. Cir. 2004) (discussing a complaint filed 
pursuant to § 549 of the Bankruptcy Code to avoid payments made by a debtor) (citing 11 U.S.C. 
§ 550(a)). 
95. See 11 U.S.C. § 704 (describing a trustee’s duty to collect all assets of the debtor to maximize 
the property interests available to satisfy the claims against the debtor); see also Batlan v. Bledsoe (In re 
Bledsoe), 569 F.3d 1106, 1109 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Under 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1), a trustee ‘may avoid any 
transfer of an interest of the debtor in property . . . that is voidable under applicable law.’”). 
96. See, e.g., Zubrod v. Kelsey (In re Kelsey), 270 B.R. 776, 780 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2001) (detailing 
the argument of the debtor’s wife—the recipient of the funds in question—that the debtor did not 
transfer his sole property and therefore the conveyance was not an avoidable transfer). 
97. See, e.g., Locke v. Schafer (In re Schafer), 294 B.R. 126, 131 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (confronting 
the issue of whether a debtor’s deposit into a checking account is a transfer and holding a deposit 
unambiguously falls within the broad definition of transfer for purposes of the Bankruptcy Code). 
98. Compare In re Bledsoe, 569 F.3d at 1113 (invoking In re Bernard’s extremely broad definition 
and interpretation of transfer within the Bankruptcy Code and stating that deposits may constitute 
transfers), with Ivey v. First Citizens Bank & Tr. Co. (In re Whitley), 848 F.3d 205, 208–09 (4th Cir.) 
(explaining the long-standing precedent in the Fourth Circuit is that bank deposits are not transfers), 
cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 314 (2017).  But see Redmond v. Tuttle, 698 F.2d 414, 418 (10th Cir. 1983) (finding 
a debtor’s deposit of checks into a bank account was a voluntary transfer).  The broad interpretation 
has materialized in the Ninth Circuit and Tenth Circuit, and the narrow interpretation has arisen out 
of the Fourth Circuit. 
99. In re Whitley, 848 F.3d at 210; Bernard v. Sheaffer (In re Bernard), 96 F.3d 1279, 1282 
(9th Cir. 1996); Tuttle, 698 F.2d at 417 n.8.   
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As will be discussed, infra, this split is not reserved to the circuits and is 
similarly entrenched in bankruptcy court and district court decisions. 
Despite the Supreme Court’s declination to grant certiorari as to this 
issue, an analysis of the merits of each side of the split’s construction is 
warranted to aid the remaining circuits and lower courts as well as 
practitioners in their analysis should they face this issue.  Further, this 
comment seeks to highlight factors that a court faced with this issue may 
consider in determining whether, under the individual facts of its case, a 
debtor’s deposit should constitute a transfer. 
IV.    CIRCUITS THAT HAVE DECIDED THE ISSUE ARE SPLIT 
AS TO WHETHER A DEPOSIT CONSTITUTES A TRANSFER  
As discussed, supra, the plain language of the Bankruptcy Code’s 
definition of “transfer” includes “each mode, direct or indirect, absolute or 
conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing or parting with—
(i) property; or (ii) an interest in property.”100  Thus, the question at issue 
in this comment is squarely an issue of statutory interpretation.101  The 
Fourth Circuit, Ninth Circuit, and Tenth Circuit have varying interpretations 
of this provision. 
A. Tenth Circuit 
In 1983, just five years after Title 11 was codified, the Tenth Circuit 
decided Redmond v. Tuttle.102  In Tuttle, a voluntary joint bankruptcy petition 
was filed alongside a schedule of assets reflecting no cash in the debtors’ 
bank accounts.103  A few months later, the trustee received a letter from 
First National Bank informing him that the debtors held approximately 
$4,500 in a checking account with them.104  The trustee recovered the funds 
for the estate and the debtors responded by claiming they were unaware of 
the existence of the funds in the account and subsequently sought an 
exemption of those funds.105  The bankruptcy and district courts denied 
 
100. 11 U.S.C. § 101(54)(D); see supra text accompanying note 61. 
101. See Barnhill v. Johnson, 503 U.S. 393, 397–98 (1992) (“‘What constitutes a transfer and 
when it is complete’ is a matter of federal law.” (quoting McKenzie v. Irving Tr. Co., 323 U.S. 365, 
369–70 (1945))). 
102. Redmond v. Tuttle, 698 F.2d 414 (10th Cir. 1983). 
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the debtors’ amendment to exempt the property.106  Before the Tenth 
Circuit, the debtors argued that they should be granted leave to freely 
amend,107 but the Tenth Circuit rejected that argument, reasoning that 
assets that are fraudulently transferred only to be later recovered by the 
trustee lose their eligibility for exemption.108  The Tenth Circuit ultimately 
determined that the deposits—specifically, twenty-seven checks—were 
voluntary transfers of funds out of the estate, rendering them property of 
the estate ineligible for exemption.109 
B. Ninth Circuit 
The first landmark decision to address this issue within the Ninth Circuit 
was Bernard v. Sheaffer (In re Bernard).110  In re Bernard arose from a Chapter 7 
debtor, Alan Bernard, who had withdrawn $44,010 from his account in 
February prior to October of the same year that he and his wife filed 
bankruptcy in.111  A creditor filed an adversary suit opposing the Bernards 
being entitled to discharge, and Alan Bernard later testified that he depleted 
his account on the advice of counsel to evade attachment and spent the 
funds on vacations during which he lost a large amount of the money to 
gambling.112  Consequently, the estate became “virtually worthless” and the 
Bernards were denied discharge.113  The bankruptcy court found the 
Bernards’ withdrawals to be fraudulent transfers warranting denial and 
revocation of discharge, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed in 1996.114  The 
 
106. Id. at 415–16. 
107. Id. at 416.  The debtors relied on Federal Rule of Bankruptcy 110, which has since been 
superseded by the Bankruptcy Code of 1978.  However, to the extent they are consistent with the 
Bankruptcy Code, the rules have “continued validity.”  Id.  As to the request to exempt the property, 
the debtors relied on § 522.  11 U.S.C. § 522(g) (2012); Tuttle, 698 F.2d at 416. 
108. Tuttle, 698 F.2d at 417–18.  The Tenth Circuit’s reasoning behind this decision required 
application of the statutory definition of transfer, and an interpretation thereof.  Id.  The court noted 
that the transfer is broadly defined to encompass deposits in a bank account.  Id. at 417 n.8. 
109. Id. at 418. 
110. Bernard v. Sheaffer (In re Bernard), 96 F.3d 1279 (9th Cir. 1996). 
111. See id. at 1281, 1283 (determining a deposit could constitute a transfer, thereby setting the 
precedent for several Ninth Circuit cases to follow). 
112. Id. at 1281.  In fact, Alan Bernard first testified that he made the withdrawal to finance a 
vacation, and later changed his testimony and admitted that “an attorney had advised him to [cash out] 
to evade attachment.”  Id.  Bernard further admitted that upon withdrawal, before spending the funds 
on a vacation and gambling, he “stashed the cash in a safe at his home.”  Id.  The advice Bernard claims 
he took to evade attachment demonstrates the type of culpability typically accompanying a debtor’s 
deposits or withdrawals that are deemed transfers by the courts. 
113. Id. at 1283. 
114. Id.   
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Ninth Circuit determined that the Bernards possessed the intent to hinder 
or delay, and the withdrawals were made within one year prior to the 
Bernards’ October 7, 1991 filing.115 
In reaching its decision, the Ninth Circuit emphasized how “extremely 
broad” the definition of transfer is within the Bankruptcy Code.116  The 
court also found persuasive the legislative intent behind the definition of 
transfer, specifically that the legislature expressly stated that “[a] deposit in a 
bank account or similar account is a transfer.”117  The Ninth Circuit extended that 
logic to reason that if a deposit of funds into an account constitutes a 
transfer, so too should the withdrawal of funds from the same account.118  
Putting it simply, the court explained “it ought to be a two-way street.”119 
 
115. Id. at 1282–83.  Section 727(a)(2)(A) provides that a debtor’s right to Chapter 7 discharge 
may be revoked if “the debtor, with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor . . . has transferred . . . 
property of the debtor, within one year before the date of the filing of the petition[.]”  11 U.S.C. 
§ 727(a)(2)(A) (2012).  The Ninth Circuit has since decided other cases similarly.  For example, in 
Haag I and Haag II, a debtor’s discharge was revoked on In re Bernard’s precedent.  Haag v. Nw. Bank 
(In re Haag) (Haag I), No. 10-07917-EWH, Adv. No. 10-01207-EWH, 2012 WL 4465353, at *5–*6 
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. Sept. 27, 2012), aff’d, 584 F. App’x 620 (9th Cir. 2014).  In Haag I, Northwest Bank 
obtained a judgment against Roger Thomas Haag for $1.7 million.  Id. at *1.  Consequently, Haag filed 
a voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition in March 2010.  Id.  Haag later received approximately 
$230,000 in tax refunds, which he deposited into his personal checking account at the Bank of Tucson.  
Id. at *2.  Haag later withdrew $120,000 out of the account and placed it in a safety deposit box, only 
to later remove and spend it.  Id.  The bankruptcy court ultimately decided that funds withdrawn in 
cash and placed in a safety deposit box, or in Haag’s wife’s personal account, constituted a fraudulent 
transfer and determined that Haag was not entitled to discharge.  Id. at *3.  The Bankruptcy Appellate 
Panel for the Ninth Circuit, and then the Ninth Circuit in 2014, both citing Bernard, affirmed the 
bankruptcy court’s decision.  Id. at *6; Haag v. Nw. Bank (In re Haag) (Haag II), 584 F. App’x 620, 622 
(9th Cir. 2014). 
116. In re Bernard, 96 F.3d at 1282. 
117. Id. (citing S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 27 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5813). 
118. Id. at 1282–83. 
119. Id. at 1282.  It is also worth noting that the court determined that the Bernards did not 
own the money “gathering dust” in their accounts.  Id.  Rather, the court adopted the position that 
when funds are held by a bank in an account, the “‘money becomes the property of the bank and the 
bank becomes the debtor of the depositor for the amount deposited.’”  Id. (quoting Chang v. Redding 
Bank of Commerce, 29 Cal. App. 4th 673, 681 (1994)); see also Crocker-Citizens Nat’l Bank v. Control 
Metals Corp., 566 F.2d 631, 637 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[W]hen funds are deposited, title to those funds 
passes immediately to the bank . . .  [and] becomes the literal property of the bank . . . .” (first citing 
Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. S.F. Bank, 136 P.2d 853, 856 (Cal. Ct. App. 1943); Allen v. Rainey, 41 P.2d 374, 
376 (Cal. Ct. App. 1935); then citing Smith’s Cash Store v. First Nat’l Bank, 84 P. 663, 664–65 (Cal. 
1906); Metro. Life Ins. Co., 136 P.2d at 856)).  This proposition that the relationship between an account 
holder and the corresponding bank is one of creditor and debtor is well-settled in the law, a precedent 
set by the Supreme Court in 1904.  See N.Y. Cty. Nat’l Bank v. Massey, 192 U.S. 138, 145 (1904) (“[A] 
deposit of money upon general account with a bank creates the relation of debtor and creditor.  The 
money deposited becomes a part of the general fund of the bank . . . and the right of the depositor is 
18
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Ancillary to its holding, the Ninth Circuit definitively stated that account 
holders do not own the money in their accounts, rather they own claims 
against their banks.120  In determining that a debtor withdrawing funds 
from his own account parted with the interest it had against the bank, the 
Ninth Circuit deemed a deposit a transfer and laid the foundation for the 
split currently within the circuits.  This determination becomes crucial when 
contrasted against other courts who have reached divergent outcomes, as 
the issue of whether the account holder or the bank possesses not only title, 
but dominion and control over the funds kept in an account turns out to be 
a dispositive factor in this analysis.121 
In 2017, in Schoenmann v. Bank of the West (In re Tenderloin Health),122 the 
Ninth Circuit addressed a similar issue in the context of a pre-petition 
payment on a loan to the lending bank.123  A brief recitation of the facts 
provides that the debtor made a $190,595.50 loan payment to its bank within 
ninety days of filing Chapter 7 bankruptcy.124  The trustee sought to avoid 
the transfer and recover the funds for the estate on the theory that the 
payment on the loan was a preferential pre-petition transfer.125  The 
bankruptcy court found that the debtor’s pre-petition payment to its bank, 
a secured creditor, did not enable the bank to receive more than it would 
otherwise have, and the district court affirmed.126  The Ninth Circuit found 
that the debtor’s substantial payment to its bank would have diminished the 
funds available for the remaining creditors.127  Further, the court noted that 
the deposit would “subject the funds to [the bank’s] security interest [and] 
 
to have this debt repaid in whole or in part by honoring checks drawn against the deposits . . . .”); see 
also Bank of Commerce & Trs. v. Hatcher, 50 F.2d 719, 720 (4th Cir. 1931) (explaining a deposit results 
in substituting for currency a corresponding credit with the bank holding the funds). 
120. In re Bernard, 96 F.3d at 1283. 
121. See, e.g., Meoli v. Huntington Nat’l Bank, 848 F.3d 716, 725 (6th Cir. 2017) (employing the 
“dominion and control test” to determine whether a bank is an initial transferee). 
122. Schoenmann v. Bank of the W. (In re Tenderloin Health), 849 F.3d 1231 (9th Cir. 2017). 
123. Id. at 1240. 
124. Id. at 1233. 
125. See id. at 1234 (providing an overview of the factual and procedural background); see also 
11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (2012) (permitting a trustee to recover preferential payments made by a debtor to a 
creditor within ninety days of the filing of bankruptcy for the benefit of the estate).  In order for a 
trustee to avoid such a payment by a debtor, the trustee must satisfy the “greater amount test,” which 
requires a showing that the creditor received more than they would have in the ordinary course of 
distribution from the estate to all creditors.  See id. § 547(b)(5) (outlining what is referred to as the 
“greater amount test”). 
126. In re Tenderloin Health, 849 F.3d at 1234. 
127. Id. at 1245. 
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give [the bank] title to the funds,” rendering it a transfer under the 
Bankruptcy Code.128  The nature of the deposit therefore, in the eyes of the 
court, rose to the level of disposing of or parting with an interest in property, 
thus satisfying the Code’s definition of transfer.129 
The court in In re Tenderloin Health gave deference to the holding of In re 
Bernard, claiming the definition of transfer unambiguously encompasses a 
debtor’s deposit or withdrawal into his bank account.130  The key takeaway 
of In re Tenderloin Health is the importance of an inquiry into whether the 
deposit results in a diminishment of the estate.131  Within the Ninth Circuit, 
the proposition that a debtor’s deposit into his own bank account can 
constitute a transfer is firmly planted.132  The reasoning first employed in 
In re Bernard has largely been controlling since.  However, it should be noted 
that the Ninth Circuit has yet to decide this issue in the context of the Ponzi 
scheme fact set, much like the Fourth Circuit did in Ivey v. First Citizens Bank 
& Trust Co. (In re Whitley).133  In other words, despite adopting the broad 
interpretation of the statutory definition of transfer, neither the Ninth 
Circuit nor the Tenth Circuit has yet held a bank or financial institution 
liable as an initial transferee for the value of deposits made by a debtor. 
C. Fourth Circuit 
As discussed at the outset of this comment, an individual who was 
convicted for operation of a Ponzi scheme faced his creditors filing a 
petition for involuntary bankruptcy against him in In re Whitley.134  The 
trustee—in an effort to maximize the estate for the debtor’s creditors and 
victims—attempted to recover from the bank wherein the debtor 
 
128. Id. at 1243. 
129. Id. at 1245. 
130. Id. at 1243–44 (quoting In re Huff, No. 12-05001-BTB, 2014 WL 904537, at *6 (9th Cir. 
B.A.P. Mar. 10, 2014)).  
131. See id. at 1244 (“The pertinent question is whether the deposit depletes the assets of the 
estate available for distribution to creditors.”); Begier v. I.R.S., 496 U.S. 53, 58 (1990) (highlighting the 
goal of equal distribution among all creditors that underlies the avoidance powers of preferential pre-
petition transfers by a debtor). 
132. In re Tenderloin Health, 849 F.3d at 1244; Bernard v. Sheaffer (In re Bernard), 96 F.3d 1279, 
1282 (9th Cir. 1996). 
133. Ivey v. First Citizens Bank & Tr. Co. (In re Whitley), 848 F.3d 205, 210 (4th Cir.) (holding 
a deposit is not a transfer and declining to hold a bank liable for a debtor’s use of a checking account 
in his Ponzi scheme), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 314 (2017). 
134. Id. at 206. 
20
St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 50 [2019], No. 4, Art. 6
https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol50/iss4/6
  
2019] COMMENT 1409 
maintained a checking account throughout the operation of his scheme as a 
transferee of fraudulent transfers.135 
The bankruptcy court and district court ultimately found that although 
the debtor had the actual intent to defraud creditors, the transactions did 
not diminish the bankruptcy estate or place the funds beyond the creditor’s 
reach and therefore were not avoidable.136  The Fourth Circuit affirmed the 
lower courts but was clear in its assertion that a debtor’s ordinary deposit 
into his own unrestricted checking account could not constitute a 
transfer.137 
A frequently employed argument in opposition of a deposit constituting 
a transfer enlists the Supreme Court’s Massey holding.138  In effect, this 
argument highlights the Court’s declaration that “a deposit of money to 
one’s credit in a bank does not operate to diminish the estate of the 
depositor . . . .  It is not a transfer of property as a payment, pledge, 
mortgage, gift, or security.”139  An initial evaluation of this argument 
requires consideration that the authority relied upon is pre-Bankruptcy 
Code.140  Without a doubt, prior to the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code 
in 1978, Massey’s definition of “transfer” was controlling.141  However, the 
 
135. Id. at 206–07. 
136. Id. at 207. 
137. Id. at 210.  The Fourth Circuit’s decision in In re Whitley consummated a circuit split among 
the courts as to whether a deposit can constitute a transfer.  Id.  Consequently, the trustee filed a 
petition for a writ of certiorari in May 2017, which the Supreme Court subsequently denied in 
September 2017.  Rochelle, supra note 21.   
138. See, e.g., Schoenmann v. Bank of the W. (In re Tenderloin Health), 849 F.3d 1231, 1243 
(9th Cir. 2017) (arguing for the recipient of the deposit, the bank, that depositing funds into one’s 
credit in a bank does not reduce the value of the estate because there is no parting with title to the 
property.)  This argument appears to be displaced because in In re Tenderloin Health, the debtor was not 
merely depositing funds into his own unrestricted account.  Rather, he was making a payment to his 
bank, which was a secured creditor. 
139. N.Y. Cty. Nat’l Bank v. Massey, 192 U.S. 138, 147 (1904). 
140. Id. at 149 (holding a deposit is not a transfer in 1904, some seventy years prior to the 
enactment of Title 11 of the United States Code.).  But see Smiley v. First Nat’l Bank of Belleville (In re 
Smiley), 864 F.2d 562, 565 (7th Cir. 1989) (“[T]he narrow definition for ‘transfer’ relied upon . . . can 
no longer be law since the Bankruptcy Reform Act took effect.”). 
141. Massey, 192 U.S. at 140.  Even taking Massey’s ruling—that a deposit is not a transfer—as 
good law today, the Supreme Court’s holding was interpreted as limited to deposits that are conducted 
in the ordinary course of maintenance of a checking account by the Fourth Circuit itself.  See Citizens’ 
Nat’l Bank of Gastonia v. Lineberger (In re Kirby-Warren Co.), 45 F.2d 522, 529 (4th Cir. 1930) 
(interpreting Massey).  According to the Fourth Circuit, Massey unambiguously did not preclude all 
deposits made by a debtor from being transfers, particularly where they were “made fraudulently and 
collusively for the purpose of giving the bank a preference, or where they are not in reality deposits at 
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weight of the precedent should now be analyzed in light of Congress’s intent 
in codifying Title 11.142 
Despite the petitioner for certiorari in In re Whitley urging the Court to 
grant the petition by explaining, “Each side of the conflict acted against a 
well-developed body of law on this important issue.  The existence of a clear 
and now-intractable split is undeniable.  This Court’s intervention is urgently 
needed[,]”143 the Court denied the petition for certiorari. 
V.    FACTORS COURTS MAY CONSIDER IN ADDRESSING THIS ISSUE IN 
LIGHT OF THE SUPREME COURT’S DECLINATION TO CLARIFY THE LAW 
Regardless of the facts, the issue of whether a deposit may constitute a 
transfer has proven to be outcome determinative in a number of cases.144  
It cannot be disputed that the legislative intent surrounding the Code’s 
definition of transfer compels a broad interpretation.145  Specifically, the 
Senate’s report states: 
A transfer is a disposition of an interest in property.  The definition of transfer 
is as broad as possible.  Many of the potentially limiting words in current law 
are deleted, and the language is simplified.  Under this definition, any transfer 
of an interest in property is a transfer, including a transfer of possession, 
custody, or control even if there is no transfer of title, because possession, 
custody, and control are interests in property.  A deposit in a bank account or 
similar account is a transfer.146 
Despite the legislative intent expressly stating that a deposit in a bank 
account may be a transfer, there is still ambiguity in the courts around the 
 
all, but are payments,” in which case the right to set-off does not exist, and they may be recovered as 
preferential.”  Id.  
142. See S. REP. NO. 95-989, 15–18 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5801–04 
(emphasizing the breadth of the definition and specifically eliminating any restrictive language 
surrounding transfer). 
143. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 61, at 13.   
144. See Ivey v. First Citizens Bank & Tr. Co. (In re Whitley), 848 F.3d 205, 210 (4th Cir.) 
(illustrating how the refusal to recognize that a transfer occurred precluded the trustee from recovering 
a substantial amount of money for the estate), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 314 (2017). 
145. See In re Smiley, 864 F.2d at 565 (comparing the pre-Bankruptcy Code definition of transfer 
to the legislative intent behind the modern definition of transfer). 
146. S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 27 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5813 (emphasis 
added). 
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statutory definition.147  This ambiguity derives from the fact-intensive 
analysis that accompanies this legal issue.  In other words, under one set of 
facts, a deposit will constitute a transfer, while on another set of facts, it will 
not.148  Given the Supreme Court’s decision to not resolve the ambiguity, 
this comment seeks to set forth factors that may be considered when faced 
with a deposit that has the potential to be a fraudulent transfer.  These 
factors are non-exhaustive and are compiled based on an exploration of the 
reasoning employed by the various bankruptcy, district, and circuit courts 
that have considered the issue. 
A. The Dominion and Control Test and Title to the Funds  
The first factor this comment proposes consideration of is who possesses 
title and/or dominion and control over the funds at issue.149  The circuit 
courts, in applying the “dominion and control” test to transferee liability 
have reasoned that a transferee must gain dominion and control over the 
funds to be liable to a trustee.150  Specifically, courts have instructed “the 
minimum requirement of status as a ‘transferee’ is dominion over the money 
or other asset, the right to put the money to one’s own purposes.”151  
Despite the fact that banks may use the monies deposited by account 
 
147. See In re Prescott, 805 F.2d 719, 729 (7th Cir. 1986) (asserting deposits into bank accounts 
may clearly constitute a transfer under the Bankruptcy Code but that ordinary transfers into 
unrestricted accounts are not avoidable by the trustee). 
148. See Bank of Commerce & Trs. v. Hatcher, 50 F.2d 719, 720 (4th Cir. 1931) (clarifying the 
distinction between deposits made in the ordinary course of business as opposed to deposits made for 
the purpose of giving the bank a preference). 
149. See Schoenmann v. Bank of the West (In re Tenderloin Health), 849 F.3d 1231, 1234 
(9th Cir. 2017) (discussing the relationship between a depositor and the bank maintaining the account).  
It is well-settled law that when an account holder deposits monies into a checking account, the account 
holder takes on the position of creditor, with the bank as its debtor.  Thus, it may be inferred that the 
bank owns the funds within an individual’s checking account.  But see In re Whitley, 848 F.3d at 209 
(asserting ordinary deposits do not change the debtor’s possession, custody, or control and instead 
substitute the currency for a corresponding credit). 
150. Meoli v. Huntington Nat’l Bank, 848 F.3d 716, 725 (6th Cir. 2017). 
151. Bonded Fin. Servs., Inc. v. European Am. Bank, 838 F.2d 890, 893 (7th Cir. 1988).  Meoli 
stated that the bank was not an initial transferee while acting as a depository bank within the ordinary 
course of receiving deposits or indirect loan repayments.  Rather, the Sixth Circuit made the distinction 
that a bank becomes a transferee when the account holder instructs the bank itself to receive the funds.  
Meoli, 848 F.3d at 724–25.  This is clarified through an example; when a bank receives a check from an 
account holder with instructions to deposit it into the individual’s checking account, the bank does not 
assume dominion or control over the funds.  Id. at 729.  In contrast, if the account owner instructs the 
bank to apply the deposited check to a debt owed to the bank, the bank then gains dominion over the 
funds in exchange for a reduction in the individual’s debt to the bank.  Id. 
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holders to carry out their daily operations, the account holder does not 
surrender all rights to the funds simply by depositing them into her checking 
account.152  Rather, the bank maintaining the checking account has the 
“legal rights to put deposited funds to use.”153 
Dominion has also been equated to legal control, or title to the 
interest.154  In conducting this analysis, dominion and control—which 
equates to ownership—should be distinguished from mere possession.155  
Several circuits hold the ordinary relationship between an account holder 
and her bank wherein the account holder deposits funds does not result in 
the bank exercising dominion and control over the funds.156  Rather, a 
bank’s “mere maintenance of [the debtor’s] checking account does not 
suffice to make deposits and wire transfers in that account ‘transfers’ from 
[the debtor] to the [b]ank[.]”157  Despite several courts interpreting a 
transfer to require the transferee to exercise dominion or acquire title, it 
should be acknowledged that the legislative intent plainly disclaims that title 
 
152. See Meoli, 848 F.3d at 726 (holding a depositor retains dominion and control over her 
deposits into a bank account).  The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on this issue asserts that an account 
holder depositing funds into a bank does not change that account holder’s interest in the funds.  See 
N.Y. Cty. Nat’l Bank v. Massey, 192 U.S. 138, 145 (1904) (explaining an ordinary deposit into a 
checking account simply creates a relationship of debtor-creditor, not one of transferor-transferee). 
153. Menotte v. United States (In re Custom Contractors, LLC), 745 F.3d 1342, 1350 (11th Cir. 
2014).  A bank’s primary source of income is in fact the various funds that account holders deposit 
and retain in their accounts.  Id.  
154. See Abele v. Modern Fin. Plans Servs., Inc. (In re Cohen), 300 F.3d 1097, 1102 (9th Cir. 
2002) (“Dominion is therefore akin to legal control (e.g., the right to invest the funds as one chooses), 
not mere possession.” (citing Bowers v. Atlanta Motor Speedway, 99 F.3d 151, 156 (4th Cir. 1996))); 
see also Universal Serv. Admin. Co. v. Post-Confirmation Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Incomnet 
Commc’ns Corp. (In re Incomnet, Inc.), 463 F.3d 1064, 1073 (9th Cir. 2006) (“The dominion test [the 
Ninth Circuit] crafted strongly correlates with legal title.”). 
155. See Meoli, 848 F.3d at 725 (“We have thus distinguished ‘mere possession’ from 
‘ownership,’ so that ‘a party is not to be considered an initial transferee if it is merely an agent who has 
no legal authority to stop the principal from doing what he or she likes with the funds at issue.” (quoting 
Taunt v. Hurtado (In re Hurtado), 342 F.3d 528, 534 (6th Cir. 2003))).  In re Hurtado characterizes the 
entity or individual that merely possesses or facilitates movement of the funds—but does not acquire 
title—as the agent of the ultimate recipient.  In re Hurtado, 342 F.3d at 534. 
156. See Meoli, 848 F.3d at 725 (determining the bank is not a transferee of excess deposits 
because the bank did not exercise dominion and control over the funds being deposited); Bonded Fin. 
Servs., Inc., 838 F.2d at 893 (illustrating that a depository bank lacks dominion and control over 
customers’ deposits); Nordberg v. Societe Generale (In re Chase & Sanborn Corp.), 848 F.2d 1196, 
1200 (11th Cir. 1988) (“When banks receive money for the sole purpose of depositing it into a 
customer’s account . . . the bank never has actual control of the funds and is not a [§] 550 initial 
transferee.”). 
157. Ivey v. First Citizens Bank & Tr. Co. (In re Whitley), 848 F.3d 205, 210 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 
138 S. Ct. 314 (2017). 
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need not pass to perform a transfer under the Bankruptcy Code.158  
Therefore, the application of this factor should be balanced against the 
Bankruptcy Code’s generous and broad instructions for interpretation set 
forth in the Senate Report.159 
B. Accessibility of the Funds by the Depositor 
In conjunction with the first factor, a court should consider whether the 
funds allegedly transferred via deposit are freely withdrawable and accessible 
by the account holder.  That is, a court should inquire into whether the 
account is unrestricted by the financial institution maintaining it.160  When 
an account is unrestricted, the debtor is not disposing of the funds in any 
meaningful way and retains compete autonomy over them with the ability 
to retrieve them at any time.161 
Meoli v. Huntington National Bank162 explained the connection between the 
first two factors when asserting, “the [account holder’s] right to withdraw 
the deposits keeps the bank from obtaining dominion and control.”163  
Consequently, an unrestricted, freely withdrawable checking account is 
accompanied by the presumption that the account holder is not transferring 
her funds to the bank merely by holding them in her account.  Rather, the 
act of depositing funds into an unrestricted checking account purely results 
in substituting credit for currency, which is accessible at the will of the 
depositor; it does not transfer title.164  As the Second Circuit articulated: 
All of the courts that have relied on a debtor-creditor relationship between 
bank and depositor to preclude a finding of a transfer have emphasized not 
only the requirement that the funds be withdrawable at the will of the 
 
158. See S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 27 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5813 (“Under 
this definition, any transfer of an interest in property is a transfer, including a transfer of possession, 
custody, or control even if there is no transfer of title, because possession, custody, and control are 
interests in property.”). 
159. See id. (providing guidance on the interpretation of transfer under the Bankruptcy Code). 
160. See Meoli, 848 F.3d at 725 (discussing an account holder’s ability to withdraw funds at any 
time from her account unless she instructs the bank otherwise). 
161. Welch v. Regions Bank (In re Mongelluzzi), 591 B.R. 480, 493 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2018).  
162. Meoli v. Huntington Nat’l Bank, 848 F.3d 716 (6th Cir. 2017). 
163. Id. at 725. 
164. See Joseph F. Hughes & Co. v. Machen, 164 F.2d 983, 987 (4th Cir. 1947) (explaining the 
key distinction between a deposit into an unrestricted checking account and a payment, which results 
in the funds no longer being freely accessible by the depositor). 
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depositor but also the requirement that the deposits be made in the regular 
course of business.165 
This consideration of whether the account is unrestricted is so imperative 
that the Fourth Circuit expressly limited its holding in In re Whitley to the 
narrow circumstances presented in the facts of the case.166  Specifically, a 
debtor depositing or receiving a wire transfer of funds into an unrestricted 
checking account will not convert the bank into a transferee.167  This 
disclaimer affords the inference that if the account was in some way 
restricted or the funds were not readily accessible by the depositor, the court 
may have held the deposit constituted a transfer. 
C. The Effect of the Deposit on the Estate 
Next, a court should examine whether the deposit diminishes or depletes 
the assets of the estate available for distribution to creditors.168  “Various 
irregularities might defeat the presumption that deposits ordinarily do not 
have the effect of diminishing the bankrupt’s estate and therefore are not 
transfers.”169  Such an irregularity might occur when a deposit results in 
funds being concealed or relocated out of reach of the trustee.  For instance, 
when a debtor withdrew all of the funds in his bank account on the eve of 
filing for bankruptcy and distributed them amongst his wife, his attorneys, 
and his mortgage, the Tenth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel held that a 
fraudulent transfer occurred.170  This action resulted in a substantial 
reduction of funds remaining in the estate, and the Panel concluded that the 
 
165. Katz v. First Nat’l Bank of Glen Head, 568 F.2d 964, 970 (2d Cir. 1977). 
166. See Ivey v. First Citizens Bank & Tr. Co. (In re Whitley), 848 F.3d 205, 210 (4th Cir.) (“Our 
holding is limited to the narrow circumstances presented here.”), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 314 (2017). 
167. Id. 
168. See Begier v. I.R.S., 496 U.S. 53, 67 (1990) (determining pre-petition payments to the 
Internal Revenue Service could not be avoided by the trustee because the funds were not property of 
the estate, and thus, the payments did not diminish the estate); see also In re Whitley, 848 F.3d at 210 
(“[A]ny funds in the account were at all times part of the bankruptcy estate.”).  
169. Katz, 568 F.2d at 970. 
170. Zubrod v. Kelsey (In re Kelsey), 270 B.R. 776, 782–83 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2001).  The Tenth 
Circuit explained that while the funds were maintained in a checking account, the debtor had the right 
to withdraw the funds against the bank.  Id. at 781.  Once the debtor made such a withdrawal, he 
became the sole owner of the currency and it became his property.  Id.  Thus, when he conveyed 
portions of that currency to his wife, his attorneys, and his mortgage, he transferred his property shortly 
before filing for bankruptcy in violation of § 548. 
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debtor’s conduct reflected actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud 
creditors.171 
Another irregularity might occur where the bank exercises its right of 
setoff.  In other words, “there was an attempt at deposit[,] which the bank 
by its action converted into a payment on pre-existing indebtedness.”172  
For example, in In re Tenderloin Health, the debtor deposited proceeds from 
a sale of property into his bank account shortly before filing for bankruptcy 
and at the same time made a sizeable loan payment to the bank.173  The 
Ninth Circuit ultimately found the deposit diminished the funds available to 
the debtor’s other creditors and increased the bank’s secured claim against 
the estate.174  The Tenth Circuit emphasized the importance of evaluating 
whether the allegedly fraudulent deposit “depletes the assets of the estate 
available for distribution to creditors.”175 
To tie this analysis to the aforementioned factors, a deposit made into an 
unrestricted checking account, which is withdrawable at the account 
holder’s will, does not inherently deplete the bankruptcy estate.176  Where 
funds are accessible by the depositor, they are equally accessible by the 
trustee and the creditors.177  Only when a debtor’s deposit has an adverse 
impact on the estate should a court find it to be an avoidable transfer.  Even 
then, it is not dispositive.  In In re Whitley, the debtor’s deposits and 
withdrawals of investment funds in and out of his checking account 
ultimately depleted the estate by the time of filing.178  Nonetheless, the 
Fourth Circuit still declined to impose liability on the bank maintaining the 
debtor’s account.179  Therefore, in addition to examining whether the 
 
171. Id. at 782. 
172. Bank of Commerce & Trs. v. Hatcher, 50 F.2d 719, 720 (4th Cir. 1931). 
173. Schoenmann v. Bank of the W. (In re Tenderloin Health), 849 F.3d 1231, 1234 (9th Cir. 
2017). 
174. Id. at 1242–43. 
175. Id. at 1244 (citing Begier v. I.R.S., 496 U.S. 53, 58 (1990)). 
176. In re Prescott, 805 F.2d 719, 729 (7th Cir. 1986).  The inquiry into whether an alleged 
transfer diminishes the assets of the estate is well-grounded in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence.  See 
Nat’l Bank of Newport v. Nat’l Herkimer Cty. Bank, 225 U.S. 178, 184 (1912) (stating the estate of the 
debtor must be diminished for a creditor to be charged with a preferential transfer). 
177. See Nat’l Bank of Newport, 225 U.S. at 184 (“It is not the mere form or method of the 
transaction that the act condemns, but the appropriation by the insolvent debtor of a portion of his 
property to the payment of a creditor’s claim, so that thereby the estate is depleted and the creditor 
obtains an advantage over other creditors.”). 
178. Ivey v. First Citizens Bank & Tr. Co. (In re Whitley), 848 F.3d 205, 210 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 
138 S. Ct. 314 (2017). 
179. Id.  
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deposit negatively affected the estate, a court should consider the bank’s 
level of knowledge or culpability as to the debtor’s conduct. 
D. Benefit Gained by the Financial Institution from the Deposit 
Finally, to build off of the previous factor, a court should assess whether 
the bank obtained a benefit from the deposit.180  Generally, a bank will 
benefit from an account holder’s deposit only when the deposit is accepted 
by the bank as payment on a pre-existing claim against the depositor.181  
When a deposit is conveyed and accepted by a bank, “the deposit is viewed 
legally as a transfer in payment of the debt.”182  Thus, if the transfer 
amounts to a preferential transfer to the bank as a creditor, the transfer may 
be avoidable by the trustee.183  This is contrasted with an ordinary deposit 
made into a checking account wherein the bank does not receive an 
advantage or any meaningful value beyond the benefits of increased funds 
maintained by the financial institution.184  In the context of an ordinary 
deposit, a bank acts as a “financial intermediary” facilitating the movement 
and maintenance of funds into and out of checking accounts.185  A financial 
intermediary receives no benefit, and therefore should not be designated as 
 
 
180. Jubber v. Bank of Utah (In re C.W. Mining Co.), 749 F.3d 895, 899 (10th Cir. 2014). 
181. Miller v. Wells Fargo Bank Int’l Corp., 406 F. Supp. 452, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff’d, 
540 F.2d 548 (2d Cir. 1976). 
182. Id. 
183. Id.  This occurs in the context of “setoff.”  See Kalevitch, supra note 75, at 606–07 
(illustrating the role of setoff between a debtor and a creditor).  “Setoffs have remained controversial 
under the Bankruptcy Code as they had been under the repealed Bankruptcy Act.”  Id. at 608 (footnote 
omitted).  In the context of an account holder and bank, setoff occurs when a bank utilizes funds held 
in a debtor’s account to satisfy claims the bank has against the debtor.  See id. at 607–08 (“When parties 
simultaneously owe each other money, which is presently payable, they agree to net-out the claims or 
debts out and the net debtor will pay the other the balance owing.  This simple process is the origin of 
setoff and remains the legal basis for setoff.” (footnote omitted)).  Setoff results in the bank receiving 
better treatment than other creditors because the bank entitles itself to priority, regardless of whether 
or not the claim would be recognized as secured.  Id. at 610. 
184. See Miller, 406 F. Supp. at 467 (distinguishing between the account holder’s deposit made 
as a payment of its debts as opposed to ordinary deposits). 
185. Bonded Fin. Servs., Inc. v. European Am. Bank, 838 F.2d 890, 893 (7th Cir. 1988).  A 
financial intermediary is similarly referred to as a “mere conduit.”  Id. at 891; see also Christy v. Alexander 
& Alexander of N.Y. Inc. (In re Finley), 130 F.3d 52, 58 n.3 (2d Cir. 1997) (“Numerous bankruptcy 
courts . . . have also used a mere conduit test to assess initial transferee status.”); Sec. First Nat’l Bank 
v. Brunson (In re Coutee), 984 F.2d 138, 141 (5th Cir. 1993) (distinguishing between a mere conduit 
and an initial transferee); Hooker Atlanta Corp. v. Hocker (In re Hooker Invs., Inc.), 155 B.R. 332, 337 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993) (“Parties that act as conduits and simply facilitate the transfer of funds or 
property from the debtor to a third party generally are not deemed initial transferees . . . .”). 
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a “transferee” by courts.186 
Therefore, in considering this factor, a court should determine whether 
the bank or financial institution is an initial transferee or merely an 
immediate or mediate transferee.187  In making this determination, it may 
be helpful to consider whether the alleged initial transferee had a duty to 
investigate the debtor’s conduct and transactions.188  If a financial 
intermediary, such as a bank, had no duty to investigate an account holder’s 
activity, and received no benefit from the allegedly fraudulent transfers in 
the form of deposits, a court will likely decline to impose liability. 
Considering all of the abovementioned factors, the substance of the 
analysis is the distinction between a deposit within the ordinary maintenance 
of a bank account as opposed to an extraordinary deposit or withdrawal, 
containing an “irregularity.”189  In essence, a court faced with this issue 
should “look[ ] through form to substance” and “treat the transaction 
according to its real nature.”190  To implement these factors, a court should 
also investigate whether a deposit is acting as a “cloak for a payment or other 
forbidden transaction.”191 
VI.    CONCLUSION 
Even interpreting transfer as widely as courts have—and should, in light 
of the legislative intent—there is still a general consensus among courts that 
ordinary deposits into an unrestricted checking account do not transform a 
depositor into a transferor, rendering banks or financial institutions 
 
186. See Bonded Fin. Servs., Inc., 838 F.2d at 893 (explaining a bank simply holds funds and fulfills 
the instructions of an account holder, making them available for the account holder or a recipient the 
account holder instructs the banks to convey the funds to).  This concept of a financial intermediary is 
not comparable to a transferee or a recipient of the funds for its own benefit. 
187. Bowers v. Atlanta Motor Speedway, Inc. (In re Se. Hotel Props. Ltd. P’ship), 99 F.3d 151, 
154 (4th Cir. 1996) (differentiating between an initial transferee or an immediate or mediate transferee).  
An immediate or mediate transferee receives the benefit and protection of § 550 while a “trustee’s 
power to recover from [initial transferees] is absolute.”  Id. (citing Danning v. Miller, 922 F.2d 544, 547 
(9th Cir. 1991)). 
188. See, e.g., Furr v. TD Bank, N.A. (In re Rollaguard Sec., LLC), 570 B.R. 859, 875 (Bankr. S.D. 
Fla. 2017) (illustrating the Eleventh Circuit’s declination to impose an affirmative duty on mere 
conduits, including banks, to investigate the actions of the account holder). 
189. See Bank of Commerce & Trs. v. Hatcher, 50 F.2d 719, 720 (4th Cir. 1931) (distinguishing 
between a deposit in the regular course and an attempt to convert a deposit into a payment on pre-
existing indebtedness); Katz v. First Nat’l Bank of Glen Head, 568 F.2d 964, 970 (2d Cir. 1977) 
(discussing the irregularities that may convert a deposit into a transfer). 
190. Hatcher, 50 F.2d at 720. 
191. Id. 
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liable.192  Thus, the Supreme Court’s long standing jurisprudence on the 
issue appears to apply with as much weight today as it did in 1904.193  
Despite the current precedent pre-dating the Code and the broadening of 
the definition, for a trustee to recover from a bank or financial institution as 
a transferee, the trustee will likely have to prove more than a debtor 
maintaining a mere checking account at the institution to compel a court to 
impose liability.  If a bank were to display some level of knowledge or 
culpability as to an account holder’s illegal conduct, it may face liability for 
a debtor’s use of his account. 
Until then, the extent of a bank’s liability for fraudulent transfers 
apparently—and correctly—occurs in the context of preferential payments 
on a debt an account holder owes its bank.  In other words, financial 
institutions seemingly face liability as transferees of fraudulent transfers only 
when they are creditors of the debtor, if at all.194  This refusal to impose 
liability on financial institutions for a debtor’s ordinary transactions with a 
checking account has been properly decided by the courts that have faced 
the issue.  As one court articulated, “If there was any transfer at all in making 
the deposits, the Debtors were transferring funds to themselves; by making 
the deposits the Debtors were not disposing of or parting with the funds, 
and so no avoidable transfers took place.”195 
If courts allow trustees to pursue banks when a debtor—unbeknownst to 
the bank where it maintains its finances—uses an account in connection 
 
192. See Ivey v. First Citizens Bank & Tr. Co. (In re Whitley), 848 F.3d 205, 210 (4th Cir.) 
(referencing the Senate Report and reasoning the legislature did not explicitly contemplate a debtor’s 
“regular deposits into his own unrestricted checking account” when asserting a transfer includes a 
deposit), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 314 (2017). 
193. Compare N.Y. Cty. Nat’l Bank v. Massey, 192 U.S. 138, 145 (1904) (holding a deposit into 
an unrestricted bank account is not a transfer), with Miller v. Wells Fargo Bank Int’l Corp., 406 F. Supp. 
452, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (“If the deposit is accepted by the bank with an intent to apply it ‘on a pre-
existing claim against the depositor rather than to hold [it] subject to the depositor’s checks in ordinary 
course’ however, the deposit is viewed legally as a transfer in payment of the debt.” (quoting Goldstein 
v. Franklin Square Nat. Bank, 107 F.3d 393, 394 (2d Cir. 1939)), aff’d, 540 F.2d 548 (2d Cir. 1976). 
194. See, e.g., Parker v. Cmty. First Bank (In re Bakersfield Westar Ambulance), 123 F.3d 1243, 
1248–49 (9th Cir. 1997) (reversing the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the bank).  In In 
re Bakersfield Westar Ambulance, the debtor became delinquent on a line of credit his bank had extended 
to him.  Id. at 1244.  Consequently, the bank setoff the amount due from the debtor’s checking account 
in satisfaction of the loan.  Id.  The trustee sought to avoid the setoffs as preferential transfer and the 
bankruptcy court granted the trustee’s motion for summary judgment, accepting the trustee’s argument 
that the setoffs were partially avoidable pursuant to § 553(b).  Id. at 1244–45.  The Ninth Circuit later 
affirmed the bankruptcy court’s determination and held for the trustee.  Id. at 1248–49. 
195. Furr v. TD Bank, N.A. (In re Rollaguard Sec., LLC), 591 B.R. 859, 909 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 
2018) (citing Wiand v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 86 F. Supp. 3d 1316, 1327–29 (M.D. Fla. 2015)).  
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with a fraud or scheme, financial institutions will face potentially unlimited 
liability.196  These institutions will be at risk of becoming the “initial 
transferee” of infinite transfers that occur in the regular usage of consumers’ 
checking accounts.  To impose liability on banks for the conduct of their 
account holders is to require banks to stay abreast of the manner in which 
the depositors utilize their funds—a virtually impossible task and potential 
invasion of consumer privacy rights.197  The following passage from Bonded 
Financial Services, Inc. v. European American Bank198 illustrates the damaging 
effect imposing liability as transferees will have on banks and financial 
institutions: 
The potential costs of monitoring and residual risk are evident when the 
transferees include banks and other financial intermediaries.  The check-
clearing system processes more than 100 million instruments every day; most 
pass through several banks as part of the collection process; each bank may 
be an owner of the instrument or agent for purposes of collecting at a given 
moment.  Some of these instruments represent funds fraudulently conveyed 
out of bankrupts, yet the cost of checking back on the earlier transferors would be 
staggering.199 
This logic is sound and equitable.200  Given how incredibly common 
checking accounts are and the astronomical number of deposits that occur 
daily in the United States, to expect banks and financial institutions to 
closely monitor such activity out of fear of liability is futile.201  Further, 
 
196. See Bonded Fin. Servs., Inc. v. European Am. Bank, 838 F.2d 890, 897–98 (7th Cir. 1988) 
(explaining how banks cannot be expected to know the origin or nature of deposited funds and how 
imputed knowledge onto a bank is an outdated expectation, even in the context of criminal law). 
197. See Roger Yu, Americans are Hoarding Money in Checking Accounts, USA TODAY (July 13,  
2017, 7:00 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2017/07/13/americans-hoarding-money-
checking-accounts/472736001/ [https://perma.cc/4Y2T-ZZ2Z] (illustrating the growth in the 
amount of checking accounts and bank deposits in recent years).  According to USA Today and Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation data, bank deposits rose over 6% in 2016, to $10.7 trillion.  Id.  To 
expect banks to monitor the deposits and withdrawals of over ten trillion dollars would require not 
only significantly increased labor but also an invasion of account holder’s privacy to inquire into the 
use of funds held and exchanged in checking accounts. 
198. Bonded Fin. Servs., Inc. v. European Am. Bank, 838 F.2d 890 (7th Cir. 1988). 
199. Id. at 893 (emphasis added). 
200. See id. at 894 (“‘Transferee’ is not a self-defining term; it must mean something different 
from ‘possessor’ or ‘holder’ or ‘agent’.  To treat ‘transferee’ as ‘anyone who touches the money’ and 
then to escape the absurd results that follow is to introduce useless steps . . . .”). 
201. See In re Essex Constr., LLC, 575 B.R. 648, 656 (Bankr. D. Md. 2017) (emphasizing the 
“important policy considerations [at] play that lead courts” to decline to hold that ordinary deposits 
into checking accounts are avoidable transfers); see also Menotte v. United States (In re Custom 
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assuming nearly every adult maintains a checking account, it can be inferred 
that “virtually every fraud—certainly, every major fraud—passes funds 
through such accounts at some point.”202  To impose liability on the 
institutions that consequently maintain such checking accounts would be to 
impose liability not in proportion to culpability.  Such holdings would also 
result in forcing banks and financial institutions to litigate and defend claims 
by trustees attempting to require the bank to replenish the estate that was 
diminished in conjunction with a debtor’s fraud or scheme.203  The cost of 
exposing financial intermediaries to “the risk of disgorging a ‘fraudulent 
conveyance’” would lead banks to spread the costs to solvent customers 
without increasing any noticeable protection in return.204  The 
overwhelming policy reasons in favor of not imposing liability are largely 
consistent with courts’ rulings so far: Deposits into unrestricted checking 
accounts in which the depositor has access and control over the funds do 
not constitute avoidable transfers. 
 
 
Contractors, LLC), 745 F.3d 1342, 1350 (11th Cir. 2014) (discussing the important policy reasons for 
not holding a bank liable as an initial transferee in spite of the control it exercises over the funds in an 
account). 
202. Brief in Opposition, supra note 9, at 12; see also Furr v. TD Bank, N.A. (In re Rollaguard 
Sec., LLC), 570 B.R. 859, 873 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2017) (“[I]n nearly every case where a debtor made a 
fraudulent transfer by check drawn on or wire transfer from a bank, the bank would have had to 
previously receive the funds in question, making the bank the initial transferee . . . .”). 
203. See Brief in Opposition, supra note 9, at 12 (“Any bank unfortunate enough to have a 
fraudster customer would be forced to litigate fact-intensive defenses.”).  The respondent in opposition 
in In re Whitley boldly describes holding banks liable for a debtor’s illegal activity in connection with a 
checking account as “a recipe for enmeshing banks in years of litigation after every fraud, and one that 
courts and the Code have wisely avoided.”  Id. at 13. 
204. Bonded Fin. Servs., Inc., 838 F.2d at 893.  
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